Six New Entries to the Non-Philosophy Dictionary

Distance (Non-Phenomenological or Non-Autopositional)

Non-autopositional a priori extracted from the autopositional transcendence of philosophy and constituting the last noetic determination of the force (of) thought or the subject-Stranger.

The concept of distance functions as a general rule in an implicit way along the interior of “philosophical distinctions;” for example, the distinction of the given which imposes itself upon the establishment of a philosophy (the “present,” the “contemporary,” the “inauthentic,” etc.) and of the empirical that agrees with “its” transcendental. It is a critical concept (via the distinction of specific spaces, the philosophical theories of geometrical space always being the result of the superposition of various sensible, geometric, physical, Euclidean, non-Euclidean spaces) and synthetic (which re-articulates the divisions of the empirical and therefore the site of every schematism). From the point of view of aesthetic reason, distance is presupposed by metaphor and the cancelation of metaphor in catachresis. It is the protection a philosophy gives itself through the rhetoric against an overly individuated style. From the point of view of practical reason, there exists a distance, never completely identifiable or known, that separates us not only from inauthentic values but also from their cause, radical evil. Post-Husserlian phenomenology has made explicit use of minimal “phenomenological distance” given by phenomena or representations (Max Scheler, Michel Henry) in the “return to things themselves.” Deconstructionists have aggravated the necessity of distance over the non-topological mode of deference or différance, particularly under the form of metaphor of metaphor, thus revealing that no distance is evaluable along the interior of philosophy (topology) or in its margins, but that it is “unavoidable” in order to understand the “gestures” of the latter (its mixtures, its distinctions, its operations).

The Real as Given-without-givenness excludes any “phenomenological distance” and its modes (nothingness, distinction, division, transcendence, alterity, etc.). It radically limits the philosophical importance of distance. Even the determination-in-the-last-instance of philosophy proceeds without recourse to it. It only appears as noesis (in the structure of the force (of) thought) and noema (in the correlate—“unilate”—of this structure) which correspond to transcendence as the essence of philosophizing and more particularly the essence of apriority, obviously via the non-autopositional mode. It is then determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real and takes on the noetic form of a “non-phenomenological distance” deprived of its autopositional doublet. It is designated in general as non-autopositional Exteriority or Distance (NAP-D) and creates the a priori element that contributes to the force (of) thought or that gives it its character as organon.


Other first name for the One or the Real, considered from the philosophical and phenomenological angle of Givenness. The Given in this radical sense is immanence (to) self and has no need of forming the object of knowledge. “Given-without-givenness” itself signifies foreclosure to any operation of givenness (manifestation, etc.) or thought and not simply any giving instance. Therefore, we shall call Givenness the first operation of thought-according-to-the-Given. It is givenness-of-the-Given, but is itself determined-in-the-last-instance by the latter.

The given-givenness couple or fold has a phenomenological origin and undergoes several variations that mark the post-Husserlian history of phenomenology. According to Husserl, it is the “originally giving intuition” of things “in the flesh” or as object, which is the evidence or “principle of principles.” For Heidegger, it is the deconstruction of this givenness, which is still metaphysical, through the givenness of Being itself; through it, there is (es gibt das Sein). For Derrida, it is “Giving Time,” a formula that translates and deconstructs “Being and Time.” The history of this notion continues (J.L. Marion), but in every case and whichever deviation emplaced to differ the coupling or to privilege one of the terms, it is characteristic of philosophy to no longer separate the given and givenness in a unilaterality. These notions serve together to think the manifestation of the Real in the state of phenomenon (Being or Existent, indeed the Gift itself) and its constitution as that to which thought must yield as the most originally possible.

Non-philosophy makes a problem of thought according to the One or to the Real, but not of the Real itself. It dissolves the amphibology or the “fold” of the given and givenness and treats it as a simple material to be dualyzed after serving as occasion (nomination and indication) for speaking the Real. It is the non-phenomenology of givenness.
We shall call Given the real-One and it alone. It can only be given without the excess or the other-world of an act of givenness, and certainly not with a giving instance on which it would depend; it is the phenomenon itself. The Given implies in its essence that it is radically immanent (to) self and to nothing else (the Existent, the World, Being, Substance, Givenness, Appeal, etc.). Non-constituted and “separated,” the Real is firstly and only given (to) itself; it is the vision-in-One without the supplementary aid of an operation of thought. As for it, Givenness is first, but would be impossible if the Real weren’t already given; it would cease being the stability, exteriority, and objectivity proper to thought if the Given did not “precede” it, radically or without return, due to its primacy without priority or its status as “last-instance.”

We shall globally call Givenness the sphere of non-real or real-in-the-last-instance “reality” that comes after the Given, thus the transcendental essence of thought that finds its cause in the One-Given. It is in turn a phenomenal given and is also called “given,” but only in-the-last-instance. Insofar as it distinguishes itself from the One, unlike the latter, it supposes an operation of givenness that sets philosophy in play, the givenness of philosophy.
Non-philosophy thus manifests the essence of thought, but not the One which, being manifested by itself, has no need of being a second time; but which also can exist under the conditions of objectivity to which it must then satisfy in its own way.


Fundamental matrix of non-philosophy that defines a general order founded upon the being-foreclosed of the One and the generator of irreversibility and unilaterality between the experience of the immanence of the One and the object to which it is foreclosed, the World. Whereas the dual is still not unilateral duality (which sets cloning in play), it is opposed par excellence to the mixture as form of philosophy founded upon reversibility and reciprocity.

The dual exists via several attempts in logic and in algebra. It is also attempted and missed by philosophy via the form of a dyad between man and world, being and non-being, being and nothingness, etc. But these contraries are unified in a synthesis or a unity. Phenomenology tried to elucidate it through the idea of a parallelism between noesis and noema. Nevertheless, this Husserlian form only divides the duality of the subject and the object by internalizing it and replicating it. The ensemble forms two pairs of terms that cannot avoid redundancy: on the one hand, the subject-object pair of the natural attitude; on the other hand, the noesis-noema pair of the reduced transcendental attitude. Trying to surpass a so-called natural duality, Husserl doubles the dual function through the heroic synthesis of these two elements in a noetico-noematic correlation that simulates radical immanence. Thus, there are in philosophy certain attempts to explain the concept of dual; but these initiatives fall short because the duality of the two terms is always thought according to a reciprocity, to the reversible limit, and not according to a more orginary foreclosure. The One and the World are neither distinguished really as two terms radically “separated” by a foreclosure, nor unilateralized by the specific causal relationship that follows from them, that of the determination-in-the-last-instance. The structural mode of the philosophical Decision, despite certain attempts at unilaterality (Difference), is on the contrary that of the unitary or reversible (reciprocal, convertible) unity of contraries.

The dual is a key concept for non-philosophy that allows it to distinguish itself from philosophy. First, it signifies the existence not of a double givenness but of the duality of the given-without-givenness and givenness: of the One and the mixture of the World. This “duality” of experiences prior to any synthesis and unitary analysis is formulated in terms of foreclosure: the given-without-givenness is foreclosed to the givenness-of-the-given, and the latter in turn forecloses it in another, less originary way.

The dual therefore implies an “epistemic” break between non-philosophy and philosophy. Not only in its way of thinking (according to the real-One or man), but also in its will to liberate the essence of thought. Through its real and transcendental essence, non-philosophy is not decidable by philosophy; it possess a “radical,” somewhat relative autonomy of thought that it inherits from the non-sufficiency of its cause.

Finally, the dual engenders an order characterized by its irreversibility. It orders the duality of man or its instances in a relation of unilaterality. This relation of causality is formulated in terms of determination-in-the-last-instance or “unilateral duality.” It enables the reduction of philosophy to the state of contingent given occasion, thus a non-philosophical science of philosophy. By situating the real site of the different protagonists (science, philosophy…), the dual introduces an opening of uni-versal thought ordered in the Real alone.

It is important to distinguish between the dual, duality, and dualism. The dual, having a real essence, excludes dualism as a philosophico-religious decision in transcendence. (Unilateral) duality is established between the World-occasion and the clones of the Real, but not with the One itself. Lastly, dualism supposes a duality or a first syntax, thus a philosophical position.

Real Essence

Instance of radical phenomena in opposition to the proper order of philosophy or occasion. We are therefore speaking of “real” essence, for essence in general must be ordered in the Real and determined by it, insofar as it is a characterization operated by thought, lest it reintroduce a metaphysical interpretation.

In the history of philosophical ideas, essence serves as an ideal and stable reflection against the mobility of becoming. According to Heidegger, this reflection feeds upon the metaphysical difference, codified by the scholastics, between essentia (quidditas) and existentia (quodditas). For Heidegger, authentic difference ignores ideal reflection as essentia. It indicates another essence (Wesen) of thought, less positive and less affected by in-essence.

“Essence” is an ambiguous conceptual operator in non-philosophy and has not always been rigorously utilized. “Real essence” alone enjoys a precise usage: here it is not transcendental possibility but the Real as determination-in-the-last-instance. Non-philosophy globally substitutes a thought (of the) Real [Real-thought] of the last instance for a metaphysical thought of essence and coupling of essences. The invalidation of the mixture of the Real and language orders thought in the Real rather than in the essences and subordinates the latter as operators instead of techniques. An axiomatization and dualyzation of essence and existence are possible. For example, on the basis of essence as metaphysical entity, essence as a priori, essence as real or transcendental, essence as form, as sense, etc. Hence the variable games of interpreting according to the context: essence (of the) Real [Real-essence] or the One, essence (of) real [real-essence] of the transcendental, the Real as that which “precedes” essence…and existence, etc. The plasticity and style of non-philosophy demand a continuous work of internal interpretation and taste or affect simultaneously, i.e. the sensibility of solitary terms.

Essence (of) Science (the Science)

One of the objects of first Science or unified Theory of thought; that by which it is a theory of science and not simply a theory of philosophy; that by which it distinguishes itself also from the philosophical reduction of science to its knowledges.

Philosophy only recognizes science or sciences under the classical, i.e. metaphysical form of essence (Plato; Husserl: the Idea of science); then under the nihilistic or degraded forms of an essence that denies itself: sciences as formations of power-knowledge (Foucault); as microsocieties in a laboratory, objects of a sociology; as techno-sciences, reduced to the technical and losing their theoretical specificity; as formula: “science does not exist, only sciences exist,” etc. Via all these modes, even the most vulgar, philosophy still claims to dictate the essence of science in-itself.

First Science or unified Theory of science and philosophy proposes, among other tasks, to determine the essence (of) science [science-essence] of the sciences. Such an object is thus not philosophical. It forms the hypothesis, also of the “unified” type, scientific as well as philosophical, that this essence (of) science is distinct from any essence of the simply philosophical type, for it finds in the real-One the cause that determines it in-the-last-instance. To this end, it requires the philosophy of the sciences or epistemologies, but simply as occasion or material. Philosophy only posits an essence produced and masterable by itself, denying science any scientifically recognizable essence, requiring the remainder of the regional knowledges or empirical theories to isolate their processes of production and to serve as supports for the essence of substitution that it projects onto the sciences. Non-philosophy is the refusal of this operation; it radically distinguishes between the essence (of) science (as a science itself it is able to determine it in its specific nature) and the knowledges it produces in its observation. The essence (of) science is thus no longer this mixture of local knowledges that philosophy and the ontological decision reifies or fetishizes, because from Plato to Heidegger it has projected itself onto the sciences, denying any autonomy to the latter and devoting them to their nihilist destiny foreign to thought in its identity.

First Science has a guiding formula in common with the philosophy-of-science: “the science of science in general” (Fichte), indeed “absolute science” containing the foundations of the other sciences (Husserl). But while philosophy and epistemology circularly interpret the relation of the science-subject and the object-subject by reducing the latter to facts of knowledge, first Science discovers the object that hides or suppresses this formula and that philosophy does not see because it cannot: “the science of identity or essence (of) science.” It reestablishes the real object of a theory of science and reduces the philosophical or epistemological mixtures to the state of material that helps it determine, this time via operations of a “unified” type, the identity that science comprises. The latter is thus no longer one of these abstract generalities with which epistemology surveys [survole] the sciences and claims to safeguard their essence while simply annihilating it.

The essence (of) science appears under two associated forms. From the side of the Real, it appears as force (of) thought insofar as it is the identity-in-the-last-instance of theory (science) and pragmatics (philosophy), whereas the force (of) thought is not subject-(of/for)-science without being subject-(of/for)-philosophy. From the side of the object, it appears as identity or sense (of) identity [identity-sense] of the philosophy of the sciences or even epistemo-logical Difference, etc.

Stranger (Existing-Subject-Stranger)

Other first name for man (as) subject 1) existing beyond its nucleus of real immanence; 2) in occasional relation with the World; 3) not as opposed to another [un autre] or facing an Other [un Autrui], but as radical form or clone of the Other itself [him/herself].

If it is not Plato who makes of the Stranger, in relation to Being and Non-Being, to the One and the Multiple, the introducer and spokesperson of the highest doctrines, the Stranger is one of the greatest unknowns of philosophy which has sometimes substituted it for the linguistico-cultural problem of “strangers” received from the social and political sciences, sometimes and more frequently the problem of the “Other” which it has believed to be able to rule in the best of cases (Fichte, Husserl) through that of Intersubjectivity as simple reconstruction of the old specular topos of the alter ego. Only Levinas at the Judaic limits of philosophy has developed a reflection on the conditions of man as Stranger, but always within the context of the equation: man = the Other man as absolute inversion of the modern philosophical equation: man = Self, and Other = other Self. In every case in fact and in their socio-political degradations, the Stranger is always Other than the Self to various degrees, face to face with the Self, consequently lacking identity and harboring threat and aggressiveness. Philosophy has never yielded to the idea that the Self, the man that I am, could be the Stranger itself [him/herself]. The stubborn search for exception and unicity (in the name of the subject) has made it mistake the identity of the Stranger.

Non-philosophy, through the reconstructed and successive concepts of the individual, minorities, unary multiplicities, has finally found in the Stranger its strategically most adequate concept of man, more exactly of the subject as existing beyond the real immanence that it nevertheless is in its ultimate cause. Determined-in-the-last-instance by the real or radically immanent Ego, the subject exists in certain transcendental and aprioritic functions produced by the real Ego cloning them on the basis of the occasion that is the World. But if these functions create it as Other-of-the-World by definition, its real essence makes it Other-than-the-World or Stranger.

Thus, the Self (the real Ego) and the Stranger cease being opposed, that is, cease being face-to-face and at war. They are identical-in-the-last-instance. The Stranger does not lack identity, for she possesses it in-the-last-instance; and the Self is no longer encroached upon and divided by the Other (self), but she can be, she and she alone, the Stranger. There are only Egos without Strangers of which they have no need, or Strangers unopposed to Egos, nothing but a democratic society of Strangers who are a Self-in-the-last-instance, each and everyone. Democracy is thus primarily given under the real conditions of thought, not in the World where, by definition, it can be nothing but an objective appearance; and then, during their interval, under the form of these existing-subject-Strangers who form a transcendental City that is not of this World without consequently being abstract, for it is cloned from this World or the philosophical City. It is the excess of the explanation over what it must explain: the default universal war of uni-versality, i.e. identity.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s