Non-Philosophical Definitions on Universal Pragmatics, Uni-versality, Universion, Performativity, Presentation, and Non-sufficiency

Presentation (Non-autopositional Presentation)

Immanent structure of reference of non-philosophical statements. It is a clone or reflection-without-reflecting, a theoretical givenness effectuated by and as the force (of) thought.

  • The metaphysics of Representation, or of autopositional representation as primary presence of the World, established itself in the 17th century. It is rediscovered beyond the doctrinal differences in every classical author, and it continues to predominate in the scientific psychology of perception. For classical authors, consciousness is a doubling of presence which, despite the subjective closure and cloistering, secretly reproduces an exterior of things for interior representation, a represented that prevails over its representation. Husserl and phenomenology have wanted to constitute this primary and presupposed relation to the World. But the difficult and extreme passage in the world-of-life (Lebenswelt) only signals the difficulty inherent to autopositional representation. The constitutive Representation only re-posits this relation to the world by positing the Real in thought. Thus it only posits what was presupposed by the classical authors. The theoreticians of deconstruction no doubt limit and displace the representation by différe(a)nce. However, this critique is still caught in the critiqued from which it originates: and the displacement of Representation is nothing less than its adequate emplacement by the Real. In short, Representation is the element of specularity (of the double reflection or divided reflection), of speculation and finally of speculative thought.

The circle or triad of Representation (represented, representative, and mixture of representation) in turn only serves as material in the elaboration of the concept of non-autopositional presentation. From this point of view, an exercise of dualysis would show this. The Real would be the representative, the force (of) thought the (transcendent) representation, and the World the represented, but every changes around “presentation.” The repetition or reduplication included in Re-presentation can do nothing but disappear on behalf of a simple presentation, non-autorepresentational presentation. The Real is instead the Presented, but Presented-without-presentation. It is named with the occasion or aid of presentation as the radical past of presentation, as the Presented which  has never formed the object of a presentation. As for the World, the simple but “heavy” presenter completely supports the philosophical triad; it is also presented, but through and by the force (of) presentation, thus presented-by-presentation non-representational (of) itself–there it is the noema or the sense in which the world simply gives itself. Representation is the concept of the World, an autopositional concept, but here given to the vision-in-One, i.e. to the presented-without-presentation as noema or identity of the presented (through presentation). It would remain to combine and reformulate this thematics on behalf of that of the mirror, the reflection, and specularity equally under the reserve of its dualysis.

Non-philosophy, as force (of) thought, dismantles fetishism of thought-representation, of its critical or modern, differentialist or postmodern avatars. In reality, the full usage of Representation is philosophy itself insofar as it is autoposition or autogivenness or autorepresentation in person. All philosophical critiques of Representation are not extensive enough, giving themselves a restrained concept of the latter and remaining captive to the real illusion of the philosophical Decision as sufficient.

Universal Pragmatics

One of the two styles–alongside the theoretical–of non-philosophy. Far from being its own essence as in philosophy, pragmatics is this non-objectifying proximity, here radical, of the One to the World, the usage of the latter by the former or by the force (of) thought. Its essence is thus the cloning universion by the Real which dedicates the subject-Stranger to the usage of the World. In virtue of this essence, it is transcendental and universal (uni-verselle).

  • Rather than enumerating the explicitly pragmatist (James, Dewey) or pragmaticist (Peirce) philosophy with their avatars (Rorty), or rather than tracing the grand lines of pragmatics as theories of discourse, it is more interesting to isolate the elementary syntactic nucleus of every pragmatics as usage or pragmateia of things (including discourse) in opposition to the theoretical attitude. One labels pragmatics the semi-relation of usage or proximity, of the identification of a term Y with a term X (which is independent or distinguishes itself from Y from its side alone). This identification is a way of turning towards, a turning point, a turn of Y towards X, thus a non-objectification of an objective term X, in some sense a semi-objectivity distinct from the theoretical objectification which is bilateral and reciprocal more or less to a lengthy term. Hence–this is an example but which gives the essence of pragmatics–the spontaneous pragmatics of phenomenology which describes independent objects in a quasi-mimetic or identificatory way, yet the latter refusing to identify themselves with their description and affirming their autonomy “in-itself,” such that the givenness of ideal objectivity or the identity of the thing in person throughout the multiplicity of goals or attempts (Husserl); or the usage of Being by being and being by Being (Heidegger). These examples demonstrate the extent of the pragmatic posture within the heart of all contemporary philosophy. It is essential to note that, despite the independence of the term X distinguishing itself from Y which does not distinguish itself from it, this schema of unilaterality veers toward a semi-circularity or a broken circularity, no doubt, but which conserves as essence the autopositional circularity of the identification (of Y with X) itself. This syntactic aspect in general combines with an experience of the real as acting or action and is better known as the criterion of pragmatic thought. Action is then the ultimate criterion that enables dissolving the conceptual confusions of metaphysics, it is to distinguish really clear ideas from those which are only seemingly so, because this action is itself conceived rationally (Peirce) or conceived in a more pratical and sensible manner (James).

Non-philosophy conserves the irreducible syntactic nucleus of a proximity or a certain identification of the subject with the World in general in the usage it creates. But by transferring this nucleus onto the terrain of the Real or the vision-in-One, it changes its essence, its real status, and consequently its importance for thought. The unilateral semi-relation loses the essence of circularity which it possesses in a secret or ultimate  in philsophical pragmatics and which determines that the immediate identification of Y with X be finally auto-positional, reversible, and alienating of Y. If Y is the inalienable Real, it cannot itself be identified with the World, but only under the “mediating” form of a cloned transcendental function, which it is not but to which it contributes through cloning, the latter being provoked by the occasion that the World is. Thus the non-objectifying syntax of proximity to an “objectivity” subsists, but only by receiving for essence the cloning operation of the Real which is itself substituted for the autoposition or circularity of philosophical identification. The Real only identifies with the World through cloning and through this occasion which ensures safeguarding it against the return to it of the turning-towards…the World, simultaneously as it safeguards the relative autonomy of the World and its unilaterality. As for the force (of) thought, it is dedicated to the thought-world, the Stranger is turned-towards the World. But instead of being two-times-each-time and thus being shut off in the magic orbit of philosophy, they are only one-time-each-time, delivered from the oldest slavery so much the less tempted by the vain hope of a metaphysical flight whose Heideggern “Turn” towards Being through Being does not sufficiently protect them. When man ceases being at Being’s use and when Being comes to the use of man-as-One, the “turning” towards Being will only be “occassionally” motivated by the latter and determined by man-One as cloning.

Thus understood or “dualyzed,” pragmatics defines one of the two aspects of non-philosophy, the other being the theoretical aspect. It gives rise certainly to a primary pragmatics, but without primacy, no longer being autopositional and pretendedly real like pragmatic philosophies, i.e. “pragmatisms.” But more than ever pragmatics is transcendental (not pretendedly real but determined in the last instance by the Real) and uni-versal (produced by uni-version): a pragmatics for philosophy and the World themselves. As for the active aspect or action of this uni-versal pragmatics, it arises from the Real as being-Performed in-the-last-instance and from the force (of) thought as performational. Thought is precisely force (of thought) for reasons of pragmatic syntax, reasons of usage of the World by the subject which unilaterally identifies with it.

Universality (Uni-versality and Generality)

Characteristic of the vision-in-One of giving or manifesting every X via the mode of the One itself or the mode of given-without-givenness and separated-without-separation. Far from being self-enclosed, it is de jure open-without-ekstasis to the World in an immanent way. Uni-versality determines-in-the-last-instance the “non-Euclidean” generality of non-philosophy and gives it its sense.

  • Universality is an overdetermined concept issuing from the combination of the proper structure of the philosophical Decision and the scientific knowledges the latter requires. The Decision presents two levels of universality: that of the Dyad as level of the universal and necessary a priori (universality in the a priori mode); that of the Unity of synthesis or system (universality in a transcendental mode) in the sense of totality or the One-all. Another proximal description of the preceding discerns in metaphysics the onto-theo-logical triangulation of an ontological base, the Dyad of Being and the Existent, and of a summit constituted by the Existent cause par excellence, God, who determines the base or horizontal plane. But perhaps in this case it is still a restrained, historical, and doctrinal version of a more universal structure which would be the crossing of two axes: the horizontal axis of Being and the Existent, and the vertical axis, instead ontic, of the One and the Multiple, a structure on the verge of closing through a double process of recovery: of the Existent and the Multiple, of Being and the One. The so-called formalization of the “philosophical Decision” extracts the minimal structure common to these models and makes the two connected planes of universality appear. The essential of the philosophical type of universality is in the connection of these two planes, thus in a unitary conception of the universal as divided in generality and totality. itself founded on division or the dyadic type. Completely understood, this structure varies through diverse positions and doctrinal decision, through the tangle of the “theories” of generality and universality.

We emphatically distinguish generality and universality (sometimes written uni-versality in order to indicate its veritable scope and to distinguish between its philosophical concept), but on a non-unitary mode, without division or philosophical decision, in some way losing their connection or form-mixture.

Uni-versality is the essence of the vision-in-One which, far from being self-enclosed like an “inside” or mixed with transcendence, is an immanence without transcendence but not without uni-versality. The destinction of a uni-versality specific to the most radical immanence without transcendence, yet which forms a system with the being-foreclosed of the latter, is the fundamental theoretical acquisition of non-philosophy which distinguishes it from the mixed solutions of the “philosophies of immanence” (M. Henry included). This uni-versality is taken in a “literal” sense: as the being-turned of immanence or the One towards…, as non-ekstatic-openness, availability-without-transcending, in the sense that the vision-in-One can always give the World but give- it -without-givenness. It is also to be taken as a completely negative condition just like the vision-in-One, sine qua non, absolutely necessary but also totally insufficient, refusing to confuse the necessity and the sufficiency in the Principle of reason with philosophy. The vision-in-One is a “principle” of radical non-sufficiency which precisely gives the scope and the sense of its uni-versality to philosophy. We can say of the latter that without being a completely negative doctrine or negative philosophy, it is a uni-versal but non-sufficient theory that must be effectuated in different philosophical vocabularies, which in a sense means that it takes on an axiomatic.

On the other hand, the generality of non-philosophy is a feature of its organon, of the force (of) thought or the subject-Stranger. If uni-versality is real, neither transcendental nor logical, generality is transcendental and not real, it is a property of first terms, of axioms, and of what is deduced in the theory of the subject and in that of the identity (of) the thought-world. It can also be said of this generality that due to its origins, which are neither philosophical nor scientific, it is determined-in-the-last-instance by uni-versality. Their philosophical relations are redistributed in a non-unitary sense. The generality of the force (of) thought is indeed also an identity. It is said of mixtures or pairings, it is no longer divided by decision or philosophical faith, for it is the transcendental effectuation (through cloning) of real “negative” uni-versality. It is thus also a universality, but positive and more concrete than the vision-in-One. Cloning excludes unitary mixtures, the connection of universality and generality. Non-philosophy stops “generalizing” philosophy itself, but it can only do this in recourse to the last-instance of a real uni-versality ignored by philosophy. The “non-Euclidiean” model has help non-philosophy constitute itself, and it effectively functions on a certain level of elaboration; it is a possible scientific material. But it is itself ordered in the experience of the vision-in-One as universal.

Universion

Effectuation of the “negative” uni-versality of the One in the occasion and its causality; but not of the One itself, foreclosed and inalienable under whichever effect. It is one of the three effects of the Real, alongisde unidentification and unilateralization.

  • The philosophies of the One in the Platonic tradition obviously experienced conversion as return to the One “according to”  procession; for mystics, it was the reversion of the soul to its identity with God; for metaphysical ontology, the convertibility of the One and Being, the thought of truth and Being, the “turn” (Kehre) as semi-version; schizoanalysis, the reversion of desire to its autoproductive essence. Every philosophy in fact knows of “circumversion,” the circular version with various degrees of breakage and opening, of transcendentality and empiricity, of topography and topology, of inversion of reversal of extremes, etc. In every case of figure, the circle is the primary element of the “version,” which is nothing but an abstract arc and always carries the dotted-line tracing of this circularity specific to philosophy.

Defined as One-in-One, the Real is inalienable in effects or objects, for example in the unidentity and unilaterality through which it affects the grasping of any given. It is also exists in the functional instances to which it gives rise on the basis of its “negative” uni-versality or in which it is, so to speak, effectuated (rather than simply following or converting with it) under the “occasional” effect of philosophy or the thought-world. The occasional cause is thus univerted towards the One or immanent-in-the-last-instance. It is under this aspect that it will constitute the material for the cloning of the force (of) thought.

The possibility of universion itself must be sought not in an external and brute causality of the thought-world over the supposedly isolated vision-in-One, but in the latter’s essence insofar as it is the site of the uni-versal and obligated, somewhat negative, being-given of the thought-world. Its radical immanence and its “empty” indifference does not signify a closure but the negative condition of a uni-versal opening to every form of transcendence, consequently an opening itself immanent or without transcendence and which univerts this transcendence. Uni-version is thus the de jure operation of the uni-versality of the One which indeed depends on no occasion but on the essence of the One’s radical inherence alone. From this point of view, non-philosophy is the discovery and exploitation of the uni-versality specific to radical Identity which philosophy has ignored.

Thus replaced on the real terrain of uni-version, the “version” loses its philosophical nature of “turning,” bi-lateral or di-rectional turning. It acquires an identity, identity (of) turning, which it has never had, even in the Heideggerian Kehre. It is the ultimate condition of cloning in general in its noetic forms, since the former is transcendental and aprioritic. But it is its essence, the uni-versality of the One, which in general makes of the subject a Stranger devoted to the World, subject-for-the-World, facing the One rather than facing the World, turned one time each time towards it; consequently, from which it is impossible to “turn away.”  From a perfect mystical essence, by definition given but which gives- the World -without-givenness. man can only be turned irreversibly towards the World and can only pretend to “return” to an essence which it never lost.

Universion in particular transforms the a priori of phenomenological intentionality. The latter, without being annihilated as a movement from one goal to another, ceases on one hand being held by transcendence (the latter is only its occasional cause); on the other hand, it stops being an essence of itself or autopositional; lastly, it stops being commanded by a pole-object to which it would have to identify with and alienate itself in. Restored to its essence of uni-versality, intentionality is liberated from form-consciousness as well as the form-object: it is only “of” to the extent that it is primarily “for” or “towards.” Universion gives to the force (of) thought its universality which allows it to be equal for the World itself and no longer for such and such an object.

Non-sufficiency (of the Real or of the One)

The “principle” of in-sufficient Real is that which alone invalidates without remainder, if not a material, the Principle of sufficient Reason and its universalization, at least the Principle of sufficient philosophy. It signifies that the Real as vision-in-One is a uni-versal but simply negative condition, necessary but non-sufficient, and which must be effectuated by the givenness of the thought-world. In itself it is not insufficient, but “radical” rather than “absolute,” yet becomes so in relation to thought: it is thus as cause or principle that it exists.

  • The real, such as it is posited by philosophical decision with which they reciprocally determine themselves through various equivalent operations, is of a completely relative insufficiency. It requires decisions of thought even in its essence because thought has already contributed to defining it and affects its essence–it is the system of of insufficient sufficiency. It forms with thought a system of sufficiency or of the absolute which takes on the name of “philosophy” and expresses itself in different layers of the philosophical Decision (faith-in-the-real, transcendental-and-real unity, autopositional transcendence, primacy-and-priority of philosophy over regional knowledges, etc.). Philosophy can describe itself in this way, but only in partial or particular descriptions (according to some decision, etc.) which misrecognizes the sense (of) identity of these descriptions.

Precisely because it is radical (and not absolute), the sufficiency of the Real, that of its immanence without desire or need of thought, implies also its completely “radical” insufficiency for thought which could develop itself on the basis of it and according to it. From this point of view, non-philosophy articulates itself on a “principle” of the Real’s non-sufficiency which invalidates, by dualyzing them, the mixtures which are the Principles of Reason and of sufficient philosophies. The Real is not a problem, it is the presupposed grace in which thought becomes a problem rather than a question. But it supplies nothing but the immanent uni-versality specific to the vision-in-One. It is also necessary to supply it with the World in the form of thought, thus of philosophy, but now in the sense of simple “occasional” material or field of properties with which the transcendental and empirical effectuation becomes possible. If it is itself foreclosed to the World, thought is not, and the vision-in-One “extracts” it from the mixture it forms with the World. The non-sufficiency of the Real is completely positive, it concerns nothing but its function of cause in relation to thought. It justifies the recourse to an experience–undoubtedly special because it is the experience that philosophy has become–and legitimates non-philosophy’s claim of possessing an experimental aspect without being an experimental discipline in the positivist sense.

Performativity (Performed, Performation, Performational)

Term borrowed from the philosophy of ordinary language (Austin and Searle), transposed and generalized here outside the linguistic sphere to characterize the radical type of immanence and of the One’s acting, compared to the efficacy of language and Being in a philosophical regime or Logos.

  • In the sphere of language, a performative is said of certain enunciations in which the signifying value and the value of action, the sense and the operation, the signified and the practical are supposed to identify with one another: they “do what they say,” or more precisely: they do something (and do not content themselves to saying it) by saying this same thing or by doing it by saying it (Austin). This concept has been critiqued by Ducrot (1980 and 1984) as illusory, arising from a “confusion committed by linguists between the words they study and the words of which they make use, a confusion furthermore prefigured in language itself insofar as it is the site of a illocutionary derivation conceptualizing the words that it sets in the disposition of the speaking subject.”

If we now suppose, as non-philosophical practice authorizes, a radical identity of saying and doing (doing (by-) saying, saying (by-) doing), but which is no longer itself of the order of doing or saying, the only instance that defines itself by this identity without fail and sufficiency is the One, i.e. the Real itself such as it is defined by a pure immanence or a self-inherence of the phenomenon. The Real is performative because it is given-without-givenness by knowing (itself ) given, thus without this knowledge still opposing itself to a transcendent object. The non-philosophical usage therefore manifests the phenomenal or real nucleus which is always at the foundation of this concept despite everything somewhat divisible and effectively illusory in the usage that philosophy makes of language. In particular, it restores its verbal and active dimension and inscribes performativity into the radical passivity of the Real: we could speak of “passive performativity,” of which Husserl’s “passive synthesis” would give a first but still transcendent indication.

Thus understood as cause in-the-last-instance of thought, radical performativity completes dismantling its antinomic pairing with the “constative” function of language; it introduces piece-by-piece its identity-in-the-last-instance into the linguistic pairings that it “unilateralizes” outside the Real. It prohibits on its account the reflexive and philosophical usage of language and shows that, in non-philosophy, language is required without it speaking of the ground itself because it speaks facing the Real or according to it.

If performativity designates the immanence of the force (of) thought which does not arise from itself, i.e. in-the-last-instance of the Real alone, it radicalizes the Marxist criterion of practice, which precisely designated a certain real immanence against the transcendence of ideology, indeed of philosophy. Against practice as scission (Hegel), we will oppose practice as performativity, eventually by also calling it “passive” (“passive practice”; cf. “praxis” according to M. Henry). The force (of) thought is identically passive in-the-last-instance (Descartes) and active (Spinoza)–this is another possible reading of performativity.

Lastly, for more rigor and axiomatic clarity, we shall distinguish between the Performed-without-performation or the already-Performed (the real-One itself, not the result of the action but the self-immanent phenomenal state-of-affairs), and the Performation as activity or labor of the force (of) thought on its material. It is performational–immanent via its specific mode–without being the Performed itself.

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