Completion! Final definitions to the Non-Philosophical Dictionary


Other name for unilaterality, form of suspension or invalidation which, no longer arising from Being but from the One, is a mode of the One’s being-foreclosed, either real and not effectuated (“uni-laterality”), or transcendental and effectuated by the occasion of philosophical “nothingness” (“unilaterality”). It testifies to the primacy of (real) foreclosure over the (philosophical) negation.

  • From Plato to Fichte, negation arises from the logico-real order of an anti-thesis. Several philosophers have supposed the contingency of negation thus understood, from the fact of the reapplicability of the logical order to itself or double negation (Hegel). For philosophy, with several close exceptions (Bergson), the category of negation has its reason in non-Being or Nothingness (Heidegger, Sartre), whether matched with the negative dialectic or not. Contemporary philosophy replaces negation through more positive experiences of alterity which mitigate it (difference, multiplicity, dissemination, singularities, finitude, etc.) without for all that the unitary illusion being broken, these substitutions taking place in the linguistic element alone and remaining conditioned by the horizon, if not of Being, at least of the structure of the philosophical Decision.
  • In the sciences, the non- is bound in particular to non-classical, multivalued, or intuitionist logics. But the usage of the non- from which non-philosophy’s departure is inspired is that of “non-Eulcidean geometry” in the sense that the non- (which has finally replaced the expressions “metageometry” or “pangeometry”) simultaneously determines the limits of the Euclidean in geometry and generalizes the latter. This generalization has been thought differently, according to how one understands Euclidean geometry as a model of non-Euclidean geometry (Poincare), a position which allows admitting as such an infinite of non-Euclidean geometries, or according to how one postulates the radical heterogeneity of these geometries (Russell) and thus their restriction to spaces in constant curvature. These two attitudes–between which could be ranked those of Riemann, Klein, Helmholtz, Cayley or Hilbert for example–differ in the interpretation of the axioms’ role, and in particular of the so-called “parallel lines” postulate–“disguised definition of distance” (Poincare) (hence the idea of a “dictionary” allowing the passage from one geometry to another), whereas it harbors an empirical value for the others. The treatment of the “non-” thus involves diverse conceptions of models and axiomatics, concepts of which philosophy also makes use.

The (non-) One, suspensive causality of the One over philosophy and one of the roots of non-philosophy, is not a negation but an invalidating suspension of philosophy’s claims. Non-philosophy is not a negation, no more than in its order non-Euclidean is a non-geometry, it is the identity (of) philosophy liberated from its principle of sufficiency. Its essence is the being-foreclosed or real indifference of the One and its immanent uni-versality (“negative” condition of the givenness of philosophy). The (non-) One thus itself has a real “negative” form, which directly expresses this foreclosure or this “uni-laterality” of the One and an “applied” form or “unilaterality” of-the-last-instance which exerts itself upon the transcendental Unity, among others, of the philosophical Decision. Negation is thus no longer–despite the expression “non-philosophy”–the resource of this thought. Only the being-foreclosed as real essence can enable a non-technological usage of negation, to explain it or ti manifest its phenomenal identity outside its metaphysical sense. Non-philosophy abandons negation and Nothingness, their mitigated forms as well as their metaphysical forms, for the same reason that it released itself from Being–i.e. from the resources of philosophy. The “non-Euclidean metaphor” is thus subordinated to being-foreclosed as the “non-Euclidean” generalization of philosophy is in the immanent uni-versality of the vision-in-One…

Being-in-One (Being-According-to-the-One)

In the order of phenomenal instances, Being takes “third” place after the One-in-One and transcendental Identity, or second in the order of the (non-)One, between the One and the equivalent of Being (the experience or given of philosophy): it is the transcendence or non-autopositional Distance of the force (of) thought. If understood in a broad, for example Heideggerian, sense, we will say that it is decomposed into transcendental Identity and a priori Identity which then correspond to their respective symptoms which are transcendental being or being proper (philosophically convertible with the One) and division or duality which are, for example, the Intelligible (Plato) or Intentionality (Husserl), etc.

  • Being or more precisely the existent is primarily one of the transcendentals (alongside the one, the multiple, the true, the good, etc.) and the support of the other transcendentals which are its predicates that, as such, are in it by essence. They add nothing real to it and form ontological knowledge, knowledge without reality if not specularity. When the existent is understood on the basis of the meta- which makes it the transcendens par excellence and the meta- thematizes as such in turn, together they form “Being” insofar as it is distinguished or differentiated from the existent now assigned to functions of the empirical pole of ontological Difference. Difference (being of being, being of being [etre de l’etant, etant de l’etre]) is then specualtive and ontology is primarily ignorant of the existent fulfilled as speculation. The becoming-speculation of ontology takes on its divided-doubled structure by the meta- which adds nothing to the existent but relats it to itself as existent. This doublet or this auto-position of the existent, and thus also of Being, is the heart of the speculative or non-naive experience of philosophy.
  • Heidegger tried to reunite in “Being” as ontological Difference (with the existent) the multiple significations and modalities of Being which philosophy had elaborated and dispersed. There is then no concept not only more general and more transcendent, but also more envelopping than that of Being and then its own unity and provenance (sense, truth, locality, etc.). Heidegger confirms the telos of every philosophy, even if Being is his principal object (Being qua Being) and its element, even if it is an originary-transcending, an ekstatico-horizontal and temporal opening, a “rift” and “clearing,” (Heidegger), or even a void and a pure multiple (Badiou). A law of essence desires that the concepts of “being” be inseperable from the duality of a division and from a more or less divided horizon, indeed disseminated; from a multiple and a void without which it is unthinkable. Hence Heidegger’s effort to simultaneously protect nothingness, the void, the nihilist “vapor” and to deliver them from Being by “barring” it in a non-metaphysical way. But nothing of this touches upon philosophy, upon its effort to think itself and discharge itself from the metaphysics which cannot avoid positing Being as a presupposed which has primacy not only over the Existent but also over the One which it affects from its own division, and partially over the Other.

In non-philosophy, the nomination “Being” is still possible but under the reserve of its uni-versalization of-the-last-instance. It only intervenes in the nomination and formulation of non-philosophical instance via a mode of separation or abstraction of the axiomatic type: the One-without-Being, outside-Being, etc. But it is possible to elaborate a “non-ontology” taking general metaphysics and ontology–autoposition, either speculative or not, of Being–for material: a theory of Being such as it is cloned on the basis of Being as such. The instances of which it is the philosophical symptomatic indication decompose the totality of functions which it has fulfilled through becoming: on the one hand pure transcendental Identity, whose symptom is the One as convertible with Being or intricated with it, or ordered in it: on the other hand, a priori Identity, i.e. transcending here reduced to its phenomenal nucleus of Exteriority or non-autopositional Distance. The ensemble is the “force (of) thought” which henceforth takes the place of Being or which is Being-in-One.

The most extensive suspension of metaphysical authority is this: Being is determined or given in-the-last-instance-in-One. “In-the-last-instance” because it must be–as force (of) thought–cloned from philosophical and metaphysical Being. The “question of Being” is attached to philosophy and transformed into a problem capable of resolution according-to-the-One. As non-ontology, non-philosophy secedes from the “first science of Being” or, better yet, radically effectuates it by making of Being-according-to-the-One, and not “as One,” the object of a science in effect first but having lost the priority of metaphysics because this science is “divorced” from the One, which indeed is not the object of a first science but determines it. Finally, the statements of non-ontology, cloned from ontology under the effect of the One-in-One, are knowledges said of Being-in-One-in-the-last-instance or related to the force (of) thought.

First Name

Symbolic element of the transcendental axiomatic, formed on the basis of a philosophical concept and entering into the constiution of the axioms that describe the One.

  • A first term is that which resists every regression according to Aristotle’s demand. One can relate it to other terms either by definition or by a system of principles. In philosophy, first terms can give the hope of breaking the circularity of the commencement and at least to introduce an appearence of deductive rigor in it against the “hermeneutic” penchant: which can include the cogito as axiom belonging to a quasi-mathematical order of reasons; or the first notions posited by Spinozist definitions. But these attempts arise from an ontological axiomatic to the extent that every philosophy remains structured like a metaphysics. These terms thus in fact remain intuitive (intellectual intuition) and can at any moment be re-introduced into the philosophical circle of the given and the demonstrated, of premises and consequences.

When a term no longer results from a conceptual and metaphysical abstraction but a really-axiomatic abstraction (somewhat non-formal), i.e. when it is related to the One-in-One in-the-last-instance, employed on the basis of the philosophical concept by the force (of) thought, referred to this intuitive usage of the concept but deprived of its philosophical sense, it is “formalized” and “symbolized” in a transcendental and first manner par excellence. The first terms of non-philosophy, which principally describe the One and the subject-force (of) thought, are first both due to their uniquely axiomatic abstraction and due to their transcendental status.

These are first names, but only in-the-last-instance, even when they are said of the One, the Real, etc. There are no–save in onto-theo-logy–absolutely proper names, but radically proper or proper in-the-last-instance alone. Even though by their occasion or philosophical extraction they have an aspect of representational content, regional-and-fundamental, but by their real essence–their identity (of) concept, non-conceptual identity–they are indifferent to the philosophical hierarchies and to the deconstruction or dissemination of the latter. With an equal intraphilosophical interpretation, which restores it to the transcendental and finally to the “One,” which it can always serve to describe, any philosophical concept whatsoever can be treated as a first name and inserted into the axioms. In this sense, first names result from the cloning of words from philosophy by the One-of-the-last-instance. These are no longer mixtures of language and Being said of the metaphysical One in the signboard of the reversibility of words and things. They no longer designate the inherence of the referent within the word either from the point of view of the performativity (analytic philosophies) or from the point of view of the “mystical” (Wittgenstein). They result from a usage that could be called “mystical-in-the-last-instance,” according to the One and not simply when they are said of the One. These proper or first names arise from a transcendental and uni-versal pragmatics which produces them as non-conceptual symbols on the basis of conceptual material.


Cloned-according-to-the-One from the Logos, from the philosophical mixture of thought and language. Language and its function of ontological opening, of language-world, is received in its sense (of) identity by the force (of) thought as language-universe, or uni-versal in-the-last-instance for philosophy, the World, and the Logos itself. Language-universe is the identity (of the) language-world or Logos.

  • Beforce the various philosophical conceptions of language, a philosophical invariant consists in bestowing upon language a transcendental function (in a broad sense) of world, opening, and being. Hence its status simultaneously as (real) referent and as explicit or implicit organon of philosophy. To speak is always and in every way to open, to tear, to surpass, to transcend. This transcendental opening is a dimension which discovers its empirical condition of existence in the variable linguistic digressions between the signifier, the signified, signification, sense, sign, etc. The “linguistic turn” is nothing but a possibility programmed by the essence of the philosophical Decision and actualized by supplementary historical causes.

Non-philosophical pragmatics recognizes itself as an activity of language, but it treats language as an inert material concerning its properties of the Logos, the One determining it in-the-last-instance without the mediation of philosophy’s operations. We shall thust distinguish:

1) language as claiming to be constitutive or co-constitutive of the Real itself (philosophy), a linguistico-philosophical appearance or language-world which non-philosophy transforms into a simple material;

2) the transcendental-axiomatic usage of language as clone in-the-last-instance of language-in-philosophy;

3) language in its signifying wrapper and signified as support of the reality of the force (of) thought and its non-philosophical a prioris, i.e. the duality of the (non-)One, the support being a function which is more than the clone-according-to-the-One and less than the constitution of the Real (philosophy) through language or Logos.

Language is necessary for the axiomatic formulation of the One and the force (of) thought, if at least we propose to think according-to-the-One. On the other hand, it is not necessary to the essence of the One or to its internal structure. The axiomatic position of the Real, i.e. thought according to the One as non-philosophy, is contingent in relation to it: it indeed has its determination in it but only in-the-last-instance. By using language as a simple material inseparable from the philosophical concept, non-philosophy restores its essence: it transforms the latter into a mode of the (non-)One. The axiomatic descriptions of the One, of the force (of) thought, and of the philosophical material’s sense (of) identity no longer designate the fine-infinite form of a World but arise through their being-manifested-in-the-last-instance from the immanent Uni-verse which shelters the vision-in-One. The usage of language’s logos supposes a spontaneous autofactualization and fetishization of language. Its setting-in-universe defetishizes it as much as possible by relating it to its aprioritic, transcendental, and finally real conditions. We call “language-universe” this clone produced on the basis of the logos or the language-world. In the vision-in-One, language is given-without-givenness, ungenerated and ungenerating, sterile, delivered from the goals and slavery of poetry. This usage of language without closure–where language is no longer its own closure as in Wittgenstein–supposes that it stops defining and delimiting the pragmatic aspect of thought and that it become instead the object of a pragmatics which furthermore defines it.


Usage of rhetoric and its philosophical employment according to the vision-in-One. More than a philosophically “generalized rhetoric,” it is a uni-versal rhetoric for the thought-world.

  • Primarily, rhetoric is less a specific domain than an organon. Nevertheless, classical philosophy treated it in a specified way as fulfilling two functions: ornamentation–excluding, if you will, being taken for the “whole dry truth” (Leibniz)–and persuasion, which was confined at best to writings classified as “synthetic” (for example, The Principles of Philosophy or the Monadology), more apt to be read by those who let themselves be led by their imagination. Philosophy excludes rhetoric to protect itself from the inessential and the ignorant as well as from the multiplicity of other contemporary philosophies (this is why it requires all the same a force of conviction) and the existence of autonomous exteriorities. It internalizes the latter by postulating a non rhetorical usage (in a negative and restrained sense) of language to protect itself from the modifications and falsifications unmastered by it. The relations between classical philosophy and rhetoric will then be all the more complex than the latter equally supposed a simple and natural manner of speaking after being able to evalute turns and figures, and that this simplicity has been founded on a non-figural figure, “catachresis” or dead metaphor (cf. in particular Fontanier). The Moderns have taken account of the ambiguous complexity of these relations, either in a weak fashion by postulating that philosophy seeks to convince the public of its readers (Perelmann-Obrecht-Tytecka), or in a stronger way by postulating a philosophcial anaphore as veritable gesture of establishment (Souriau). In effect, after one admits that all interpretations of philosophy, even the most contradictory, belong to it (Leibniz, German Idealism), rhetoric can invest all philosophy. But it is a above all with and after Nietzsche, around him, that rhetoric becomes an explicit theme investing a field equivalent to Being and organizing its own modes of manifestation. Rhetoric is then required more or less strategically, like the signifier, to semi-objectively describe the operations or gestures of philosophy (Derrida, Galay). The margins, disseminations, ashes, monstrosity, forgetfulness, the Other, etc. become philosophical terms on the same rank as classical themes; they even belong as the at least partial conditions of their apprehension. There is thus no truth without rhetoric. No metaphor is a catechresis but a metaphor of metaphor, the classical example appearing as a rhetorical turn. It is not a question of reducing philosophy to rhetoric but of setting ontology between parentheses in philosophy. This is the meaning of a “generalized rhetoric,” an active affirmation of the Other or drive in philosophy.
  • The goal of generalized rhetoric is not to specify these deviations but to administer their ensemble into distinct singularities: it is a transcendental rule of relations between forms and contents, between syntaxes and themes, between multiplicities and exteriorities. Rhetoric is thus simultaneously means and metastable variance of deviations, of differences of philosophical potentials. Philosophy only conserves the rhetoric that allows the distinction and mastery of alterity and exteriority according to its own structure of doblet and redoubling (of simulacra). It even becomes (cf. Nietzsche) the possibility of an almost rigorous reversibility between philosophy and its alterities, its exteriorities, in such a way that the former does not lose itself, it is conserved in its consistency and its coherence by giving itself the means of mastering these sets of relations. Hence Deleuze’s extreme thesis: there is no metaphor, which is the opposite of generalized rhetoric.

Liberated from philosophical sufficiency, non-philosophy does not have to reduce the “turns” for the example or denial of rhetoric, nor to exclude the multiplicity of philosophies founded on the recourse to the latter. On the contrary, it liberates rhetirc after enriching and modifying the philosophical material. Non-spatializing, it enables recognition in Being and the discourse of all possible spaces, and even those which found the distance that each philosophy gives itself in the empirical which is given to it, in that which it constructs according to its transcendentals, or even in that which it calls “real.” The rules of transformation of the material are indifferent to rhetoric and hence liberate the later from its philosophical restrictions.

“Non-rhetoric” is the manifestation of language according to the One which is not language, but such that it is no longer measured by an efficacy (persuasion) or an inefficacy (the obscuring of relations of transparency with the real). This latter division between force of conviction and force of transparency has no place here, for it merely reinforces philosophical divisions and hierarchies. Let us simply speak of a force (of) language which transforms the relations of transparency and conviction. Non-rhetoric treats these relations as so many identities and no longer seeks in the use of a metaphor that which is “properly” philosophical and that which is not–the distinction of disciplines is no longer subordinated to philosophy. We shall call “style” the “strangerhoods” which are no longer related to the non-figural or to the normal but each comprised as identity (of the) philosophical and (of the) non-philosophical. Every attempt will be able to be recognized as individuated, each turn or figure treated as a mode of the identity of the subject-Stranger. Nothing can then limit the play of figures: they are so many proper names of the identities of the Ego and the Stranger. Style justifiably posits the identity of heterogeneous elements without seeking to reduce them according to a supposedly normative or fundamental wrapper of language. Thus, rhetoric is no longer evaluated according to representational contents nor limited in view of the control and mastery of alterity after protecting a certain traditional image of thought. Considered as identities rather than as relations or differences of potential, figures can be posited in-the-last-instance either as radically different or individuated without there being a relation of active indifference between these two solutions, for it is no longer a question here of dividing and hierarchizing Being.


Unified theory of technics and philosophy. It takes for material or object their unitary relations of techno-scientific mixture and above all the engineer sciences–engineering–which it treats as its proximate symptom. It extracts from it a thought through orders (of) identity qualitatively different and trasncendentally distinct. It relates the technico-philosophical complex, with its ideologies (all-technology, technologism, techno-science, end of philosophy, etc.) to the Real which enables the critique of these illusions and determines these heterogeneous orders in-the-last-instance.

  • The term “technology” has a minor but momentous history whose invariant is the articulation of technics and logos. It has primarily designated the limited domain of description of know-hows, of their tools and ingredients, to now designate the mixtures of technics and sciences in their interpretations and political, economic, and social usages. This latter preference finally tends to identify technology with knowledge of networks, systems, and complexity, its essence being to articulate heterogeneous elements on all levels and all orders. This concept thus almost naturally discovers its place in monist philosophies and sociologies, in the case where the real is identified with the complexity of networks. Scientific technics, through their imitation, can function as breaks, but the continuities are privilged the moment when technology is thought of as the silent and omnipresent transcendental of so-called “postmodern” society whose philosophical finesse is exerted in a sort of sceptical relativism, where the grand categories of Mann, Science, and Work appear as products of networks and lose their autonomy.
  • The philosophical critique of this concept consists in creating its genealogy and showing that it is the result of the reversal and intensification of a narrow and reductive conception of science, characterized by the opposition of theory and experience, thus in several proximate displacements of the logos and technics. In contrast, philosophy does not destroy the amphibology essential to this concept which would allow it to extract its most positive value. Technology seems to be the schematizing articulation of two heterogeneous orders. The first is formed by extremely diverse multiplicities of finite events or problems, simultaneously technical and scientific–it is somewhat a question of the sciences of engineering in their broadest conception. The second is its imaginary continuation and totalization which functions in the manner of a schematism which relates these events to Being.  Technology thus has two types of existence, almost always confused, which makes it oscillate between the engineering sciences and philosophy. This inequality confers upon it in the same stroke the traits of competency and humanism, often considered as the foundations of the good in democracy. One then finds that the definitions of technology are too narrow and that philosophy itself is technology: the former explaining the latter.

Non-philosophy does not content itself in treating technologism as a transcendental illusion. It takes the technological discourses and metadiscourses seriously but as a disguised description of that which would make us forget the illusion: that which is “at the heart” of the epistemological opposition between “theory” and “experience,” between “logos” and “technics.” In effect, the engineering sciences, which almost have no place in classical epistemology and which are in some way the “truth” of technology, are its symptom. The transformation of technological statements outside “sufficiency” allows these sciences to emerge, to designate a broader and more specific conception of them, to destroy the epistemological limits of the classical concept of science, and to renovate the comprehension of its technical usages.

The engineering sciences are not completely independent of the classical image of science but imply a new relation to scientific knowledges.  They do not define domains and are more difficult to identify than the classical sciences. They are instead generic disciplines capable of treating widely different problems in project or objective. They thus articulate knowledges of different origin and multiple levels of “concretude”: models then become more important than theories in the resolution of problems. Theory appears as a “theoretical given,” simultaneously condition of knowledge and compatibility of the models employed in this project. It is one of the reasons why engineering is often identified with design (C.A.O. or C.M.A.O.) and divided by philosophy between analysis and conception, or even between the formal character of knowledges and the articulation of models on the one hand, and the empirical and sensible content of the technologies they modify on the other.

Non-philosophy refuses this division and posits an identity-of-the-last-instance which allows specifying the engineering sciences in light of its technoscientific and epistemological interpretations. The usage of theory by the engineering sciences is then characterizable not by economical, political, or ideological protractions and projections, but by the fact that its knowledges are indecomposable in-the-last-instance, that they are investments in the models. This identity allows radically distinguishing between the conception of engineering and the philosophical project: the constraints of a problem of engineering are defined, internal to its project, although the engineer discovers simultaneously as he or she invents. At the same time, the multiplicities of the engineering sciences are neither unifying nor sensible like those of philosophy: their identity does not depend upon the terms it unifies, it is what ensures, on the contrary, the identity of the most heterogeneous terms.

Thus non-philosophy dualyzes the concept of technology elaborated on the occasion of the systematic engagement of the classical sciences and technics. Thus it distinguishes the engineering sciences from the ethical discourses with which they are accompanied in a continual way as a substitute for a lackluster ideology. If ethics simply concerns the prothetic bodies and philosophical anthropoids but not at all Man as subject-Stranger while non-philosophy posits it, the ethical problem transforms into a non-ethical problem, radically distinct from that of technology: only a transcendental illusion confuses them. Technology will then lose its function of Grand Transcendental, like what previously happened to the categories of History and Language, while its imaginary dimensions will be effectively assumed from their aspect by fiction and science-fiction.


Phenomenological method of auto-analysis in the Internal (One). Neighboring doctrine of non-philosophy, also referred to the One but through other axioms which understand it as Internal. These axioms do not form a non-phenomenology or a non-philosophy of phenomenology but posit the possibility of a thought and a language of the One (and not simply according to the One).

  • Every philosophical investigation around the concept of Europe–not to mention its corresponding mythologies–, including that of Husserl, constitutes “Europe-philosophy,” i.e. a synthetic–not analytic–mode of approach of this same concept, and must be overcome.

The point of–non-methodological–departure for europanalysis (S. Valdinoci) is the immanence of impression. Combined, these notions separate it from phenomenology–which is justifiably nothing but a methodology–and from empiricism. These notions both in fact rest upon the concept of interior completely foreign, for example, to Hume. Furthermore, indifferent to the break of inside and outside, the internal–immanent and impressive–determines a new regime of thought, for example concave or opposed to the convexity of philosophy.

If philosophy is a thought-space marked by perceptive duality, it is a question of passing from perception–and from the conception with which it pairs–to endoception, a fundamental europanalytic notion. Endoception as internal intuition is tact without contact or without spatial distantiation, a disidealized intuition without chora, which sees itself replaced by internal chaos.

Here Identity becomes a complex Identity receiving an internal Universe–certainly distinct from the cosmological Universe as well as Schellingian psychocosmism. Open, fractured, or fractalized Identity, it offers itself to method, zigzagging as representation of the unrepresentable by means of an impressive language transmissable within all mankind.

The hypothesis of an impressive language or an internal speech leads to affirming the identity of the analysis bearing upon the real and the autoanalysis of the real, or precisely “immense man.” Europanalysis skirts alongside psychoanalysis, for which everything is also internal since the latter abstracts from the sexual drive.

Europanalysis declares itself distinct from and complementary to non-philosophy to the extent that, far from claiming to be a first science where the syntax of language is detached by the foreclosure of the real, it endeavors a prescience or a genealogy of science by means of an impressive language. Moreover, by affirming, as analytical induction, the identity of the last instance of givenness and reduction, it overcomes one of the a prioris of formal ontology; on the other hand, radicalizing the concept of One-Multiple obtained by the fractalization of generalized deconstruction, it incorporates the Other in the One, which has become the Open by integralization. Indifferently, at the limit: Opening of Universe or ef-fect, Opening of Man or af-fect. An ultimate difference then certainly separates europanalysis from an idealist philosophy: this is because, recusing the concept of synthesis, it does not endeavor the autogivenness of an absolute Opening which had also rejected it, under the name of the signifier, so much the less that it admits language as external relation into psychoanalytic alterity.

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